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that due process required the trial court to identify a specific five-year
period over which to measure whether forfeiture actually occurred.
Second, the appellate court held that the trial court incorrectly
premised its holding upon Kern Delta's use of water rather than its
nonuse. Because water rights were contingent upon beneficial usage
of the water, an assessment of nonuse rather than use should
determine forfeiture. The appellate court held that the measurement
needed to include the quantity of water not used over the statutorily
imposed period of time because both time and quantity help govern
the "law of the river." The appellate court declared that because
measuring water usage for irrigation purposes "involves factors not
subject to precise human control," there was not a uniform rule with
respect to use or nonuse applicable to all cases. The facts of the
individual case determine whether a water right holder forfeited those
rights through nonuse.
As such, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial
court, and remanded for retrial the issue of whether Kern Delta
forfeited any of its MHA entitlement by nonuse, based upon a
measurement taken over a specific time period imposed by statute.
The appellate court also remanded for retrial the parties' other issues
not specifically resolved on appeal, waived, or abandoned.
Kyle K Chang

Long v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., No. E030817, 2002 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 11584 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2002) (holding
violating the terms of a United States Forest Service special use permit
is "unlawful" conduct under California's unfair competition law; and
taxpayer suits against state officials under Civil Procedure Code section
526(a) are not permissible means of compelling discretionary actions
of the State Water Resources Control Board).
Under a United States Forest Service special use permit, Great
Spring Waters of America, Inc. ("Great Spring") extracted water from
within the San Bernardino National Forest for public sale. In February
2000, Russell Long ("Long") filed suit in the Superior Court of San
Bernardino County, alleging Great Spring violated California's unfair
competition law (Section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code).
Long also sued the State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB"),
claiming it breached its duty to prevent waste or unreasonable use of
water by allowing Great Spring's extraction. The trial court sustained,
without leave to amend, Great Spring's and the SWRCB's demurrers to
all of Long's seven claims for relief. Long appealed to the California
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Two, seeking to overturn
demurrers to one claim for relief against Great Spring and two claims
against the SWCRB.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

On appeal, the court first considered Long's unfair competition
claim. Long alleged Great Spring engaged in unfair business practices
by extracting water under a special use permit not conferring that
right; extracting water without paying fees; violating the conditions of
its special use permit; not securing water rights under the Water Code;
and gaining an unfair competitive advantage by selling water at the
expense of resources held in public trust. The court found the only
allegation stating a valid unfair competition action was the claim that
Great Spring violated the terms of its special use permit. The taking of
the water itself, and the effect of this violation, excessive water
extraction or resource depletion, was not actionable under this statute.
Specifically, Long claimed Great Spring illegally increased its
extraction capacity by laying pipe, excavating trenches, and developing
wells greatly exceeding the dimensions specified in its permit. To
support a valid unfair competition claim, one must show a defendant's
business practices were "unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent."
In its
analysis, the court relied on Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., where that
court ruled noncompliance with the terms of a county conditional use
permit was "unlawful" under the unfair competition law. The court
noted that the Forest Service issues special use permits pursuant to
federal law, and that violating the terms of a permit, or conducting
activities requiring a permit without obtaining one, are federal
criminal offenses. Hence, it reasoned violating the terms of a special
use permit is "unlawful" within the meaning of the unfair competition
law. As Long only needed to state one possible cause of action, the
court reversed the dismissal of his unfair competition claim.
Although finding Long's remaining allegations insufficient to
support an unfair competition action, fearing confusion at remand,
the court addressed each to clarify the scope of the permissible claim.
The allegation that Great Spring's special use permit did not grant a
right to extract water did not establish the extraction was "unlawful,
unfair, or fraudulent." Because state law governs the appropriation of
water on federal lands, and Long did not allege any facts indicating
Great Spring's appropriation was contrary to state law, the court found
this allegation insufficient to show the extraction was "unlawful."
Under this statue, conduct is "unfair" if a victim's suffered harm
outweighs the conduct's utility. Long did not show this extraction was
"unfair" because he did not allege Great Spring's actions harmed
anyone. Additionally, while claiming Great Spring's actions were
misleading, Long did not demonstrate these actions were likely to
deceive the public, as required to find "fraudulent" conduct under this
statute.
The allegation that Great Spring did not pay an extraction fee also
failed to support an unfair competition claim. No state or federal
authority requires a water appropriator to pay a fee, or permits the
state to charge a fee, for appropriating water from public land.
Similarly, Long's allegation that Great Spring failed to secure its rights
under the Water Code was also deficient. The Water Code requires a
permit for appropriations of surface water, or subterranean streams
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flowing in defined channels, initiated after 1914. As Long did not
specify when Great Spring initiated the appropriation, he did not
demonstrate the necessity of a permit.
In the court's view, Long improperly invoked the public trust
doctrine as a basis for his unfair competition claim. The public trust
doctrine protects specific public interests in navigable waters and
nonnavigable waters (to the extent any diversion affects navigable
waters).
However, Long never alleged Great Spring's extraction
affected navigable waters or any interest protected by the public trust
doctrine.
Long also claimed Great Spring's extraction of water held in the
public trust violated the California Constitution's reasonable use
doctrine, which mandates the prevention of waste and unreasonable
use of water. Under the doctrine, a use is considered unreasonable if
it injures a competing use. Despite claiming Great Spring's extraction
depleted a scarce public resource, Long's claim was deficient because
he did not allege that the use harmed competing users.
Last, the court addressed Long's claims the SWRCB breached it
duties by allowing Great Spring's unreasonable use of water, thereby
wasting taxpayer funds. Long sought a court order declaring the
SWRCB's actions unlawful and directing it to enjoin Great Spring,
conduct an investigation, and make conclusions of facts and law. He
also sought the return of any funds due to the SWRCB for the use of
the water. Long based these claims on Civil Procedure Code section
526(a), which permits taxpayer suits against state officials to prevent
waste or illegal use of state funds or property. However, these taxpayer
suits may not be employed to compel discretionary agency action.
Relying on the plain language of the Water Code, the court concluded
Long was seeking to order the SWRCB to undertake discretionary
action. For this reason, Long's taxpayer suit did not state permissible
claims against the SWRCB. Thus, the court upheld the dismissal of
Long's claims against the SWRCB.
Arthur R. Kleven

COLORADO
Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2003) (certifying that
continued migration and ongoing presence of toxic pollution on a
landowner's property constituted a continuing trespass and nuisance
for as long as the pollution existed without removal or abatement by
the egregious party, even if the condition causing the pollution has
ceased).
Robert Hoery brought suit against the United States in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado under the Federal
Torts Claim Act for continued trespass and nuisance caused by release

